Numbers matter! The society of indicators, scores and ratings by Mau, Steffen
Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at
https://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=riss20
International Studies in Sociology of Education
ISSN: 0962-0214 (Print) 1747-5066 (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/riss20
Numbers matter! The society of indicators, scores
and ratings
Steffen Mau
To cite this article: Steffen Mau (2020) Numbers matter! The society of indicators,
scores and ratings, International Studies in Sociology of Education, 29:1-2, 19-37, DOI:
10.1080/09620214.2019.1668287
To link to this article:  https://doi.org/10.1080/09620214.2019.1668287
© 2019 The Author(s). Published by Informa
UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis
Group.
Published online: 23 Sep 2019.
Submit your article to this journal 
Article views: 408
View related articles 
View Crossmark data
ARTICLE
Numbers matter! The society of indicators, scores and
ratings
Steffen Mau
Humboldt-Universitat zu Berlin Kultur- Sozial- und Bildungswissenschaftliche Fakultat- Institut for
Social Sciences, Berlin, Germany
ABSTRACT
The process of quantification is a powerful development shap-
ing many domains of life today. In the area of education, for
example, performance measurement, testing and ranking have
become common tools of governance. Quantification is not
a neutral way of describing society, but a process of valorisation.
It has three sociologically relevant effects. Firstly, the availability
of quantitative data strengthens social comparisons. Secondly,
quantitative measurement of social aspects fosters expanded
competition. Thirdly, there is a trend towards increased social
hierarchisation because representations such as tables, graphs,
lists or scores ultimately transform qualitative differences into
quantitative inequalities. This paper unfolds the argument that
quantitative ascriptions of status ranks change our order of
inequality because things that previously could not be com-
pared with each other are made comparable. Moreover, it asks
who bears the power of nomination in the regime of numbers
and which forms of contestation might be available.
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1. Introduction
This article discusses the process of quantifying aspects of social life and the way
in which numbers are used to establish and ascribe social worth. Quantification
includes disseminating ratings and rankings, continually establishing new indi-
cators, using screenings and scorings, constantly creating new rating platforms
that we encounter in our everyday life, quantifying benchmarks, and new forms
of measuring ourselves that provide data on activities and health. In particular,
the educational field has experienced an enormous growth in the use of
performance data through evaluation schemes, new forms of public manage-
ment and international testing regimes such as the PISA-study. Educational
policy today is linked to economic growth and productivity with a strong
emphasis on efficiency and competition for which numbers and performance
indicators play a crucial role. Numbers have become the central currency of the
‘governance by indicators’. Sociologically, these numerical representations are
CONTACT Steffen Mau steffen.mau@hu-berlin.de
INTERNATIONAL STUDIES IN SOCIOLOGY OF EDUCATION
2020, VOL. 29, NOS. 1–2, 19–37
https://doi.org/10.1080/09620214.2019.1668287
© 2019 The Author(s). Published by Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group.
This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives
License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/), which permits non-commercial re-use, distribution, and repro-
duction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited, and is not altered, transformed, or built upon in any way.
not merely a reflection of reality. Rather, they provide a way of generating
difference by making things distinguishable. The rise of numbers, data and
indicators of societal self-observation is often viewed as a way to objectify and
rationalise these activities and behaviours, but they themselves are part of
a valorisation and value ascription process. They may not create quantitative
representations of the social world, but they do re-create them (Espeland &
Sauder, 2007) and should therefore be understood as a reality that is sui generis.
At the same time, numbers are taking on a kind of social usher function by
determining, showing and confirming a social order. Numbers are used to
establish not only numerical differences but also systems of worth that rank
people or organisations according to better or worse/more or less. Numbers
transform qualitative differences into quantitative inequalities. In this article,
I argue that when it comes to quantification, we are dealing with the rise of new
forms of social ranking that represent an independent system of hierarchisation
and classification. Although education is part and parcel of the numberization
of society, my paper takes a broader perspective by claiming that society is on
the road of data-driven perpetual stock taking and governance, possibly leading
towards a ‘metric society’ (Mau, 2019)1 wherein everything and everybody is
rated on the basis of quantitative data and where contestation becomes difficult.
The argument develops in several steps: First, I will characterise the econo-
misation and digitisation processes as key drivers of quantification and then
show how different phenomena of data usage can be linked together using the
perspective of valuation studies. After that, I argue that numbers allow us to
carry out comparisons which also lead to new forms of competition. In the final
step, I ask who has the power of nomination in the number regime and how
these power holders can be contested, showing how numbers are used as
symbolic capital and which effects quantification has on social order.
2. Economisation and digitization
Quantification is driven by the growing popularity of concepts such as
transparency, accountability and evidence-based evaluation. These are
often discussed using the umbrella term ‘economisation’ in which ratings,
rankings, indicators and quantified forms of evaluation play a key role. The
goal is to expand the knowledge needed for governance by making data
available in order to then more effectively steer social events (Power, 1994;
Strathern, 2000). This is made possible by the ‘audit society’ (Power, 1994),
which lives on reporting, objectives, performance observation and conti-
nually created indicators. In the field of education, for example, there is
a pervading trend to produce and utilize numbers and statistics, be it test-
scores as part of large scale international programmes, evaluation indica-
tors of schools including measurement of outcomes for students, assess-
ments of teacher performance and satisfaction surveys, or ranking
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practices. They aim at establishing effective education practice, internal
and external accountability and number-based governance notwithstand-
ing problems of measurement validity, potential corruptibility of indicators
and misrecognition of central purposes of schools (Lingard, 2013). This
implies a shift away from inputs or non-measurable aspects such as teacher
qualification or school philosophy. Numbers make schools and whole
school systems ‘legible’ for governing (see Scott, 1998) and allow for the
observation of better or worse, or improvements or deterioration, upon
which policy makers and bureaucrats can base funding decisions. Schools
also become ‘legible’ for parents who will make the school choice accord-
ingly and thus force schools to strive for good numbers.
Economisation plays a crucial role in this audit society by putting aside
non-economic aspects and strengthening organisational forms, structures
and orientations that are derived from perspectives of profitability
(Bowerman, Raby, & Humphrey, 2000; Crouch, 2016; Schimank &
Volkmann, 2008). The new public management, that is, using private
sector management techniques in public administration, therefore leads
more or less automatically to an expansion of monitoring and reporting
requirements. Public institutions and private companies are also continu-
ally expanding the data they collect on citizens, clients or employees to
exercise control, address target groups more precisely or meet expectations
of transparency. This now also includes areas such as the healthcare
system, cultural life or the educational system that have up until the
present followed a different logic. The focus on performance, cost-benefit-
relations and outcome leads to both a ‘reductionism of criteria’ (Schimank,
2011, p. 11) and a preference for those parameters that can be expressed in
numerical form (Crouch, 2016).
The quantification cult is also closely linked to the digitisation process, which
appears in very different areas of life and changes them radically. In this process,
data have become the most important raw material for the information and
knowledge economy, and as evermore elements of society are captured by data,
new business fields are arising that can use this information to find clients,
determine individuals’ commercial use or direct their decisions. Certainly, it is
still possible to remain an outsider or at least stay on the fringes of the digital
world and avoid leaving data traces, but this comes at the cost of self-exclusion
from relevant communication contexts and networks. The expansive growth of
saved data is overwhelming: Estimates suggest that between 2005 and 2020, the
digital universe grows by a factor of 300 (Gantz&Reinsel, 2012). Studies assume
that at that point in time, the average person will interact with devices that are
networked in some way around 5000 times each day, leaving digital traces. It is
believed that humankind today generates as much data within two days as in its
entire history before 2003 (Leberecht, 2015, p. 14). Everything is becoming
smart: cars, homes, fitness centres, friendship networks, and of course
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workplaces. People even voluntarily generate personal data on issues like health,
mobility and sports activities andmake thempublic (Lupton, 2016). Algorithms,
data-mining and data analysis that attempt to make ‘sense’ of the saved infor-
mation are improving together with data growth. The goal is always to make
distinctions – with drastic effects for classification and status ascription pro-
cesses. Digital status data are becoming ‘distinguishing marks’ (Bourdieu, 1985,
p. 21) par excellence.
3. Quantification as valorisation
Masquerading as a process of rationalisation, the cult of numbers has far-
reaching consequences and also changes the way in which we construct and
understand what is valuable or desirable. Indicators and metric forms of
measurement each stand for specific concepts of social value both with regard
to what is viewed as relevant and with regard to what society deems or should
deem to be valuable and worthy of achieving. In the quantification regime,
this kind of data receives great recognition. One only needs to think of the
comparative data in the PISA- study, the role of rating scores on commercial
evaluation platforms or citation indices in academics. The symbolic power can
be seen in the fact that many criteria upon which the rankings or ratings are
based are simply accepted and no longer questioned. If they are experienced as
appropriate, evident and a matter of course, then important steps toward
a naturalisation of social inequality have been taken.
With this background, there have recently been important attempts to look
more intensively at how value is created and how grammars of classification
are produced (Espeland & Sauder, 2016; Espeland & Stevens, 1998, 2008;
Fourcade & Healy, 2013; Heintz, 2010; Lamont, 2012; Mau, 2019; Peetz,
Aljets, Meier, & Waibel, 2016; Timmermans & Epstein, 2010). These
approaches operate under the label ‘valuation studies’. More narrowly
defined, valuation means setting or determining value, but here the term is
also understood as a socio-cultural practice of valorisation, that is, filling
something with value or ascribing value. From this perspective, there is no
prior, neutral value independent of the observer that only needs to be ‘dis-
covered’ or measured. Instead, we are dealing with processes of value ascrip-
tion and value manifestation. In a programmatic contribution, Doganova
et al. (2014) write that valuation ‘denotes (. . .) any social practice where the
value or values of something are established, assessed, negotiated, provoked,
maintained, constructed and/or contested’ (p. 87). If value is viewed as some-
thing that is socially produced and not something inherent, then the basic
premise of analysing such social processes will always be: It could have been
different!
Viewed in this way, the language of numbers changes our everyday ideas of
value because numbers are in no way neutral. Therefore, quantification should
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also be seen as a strategy of re-configuring and re-formatting the world and
describing it in a numerical form (Porter, 1994). When using numbers, prior
decisions have already been made as to what is to be considered relevant,
valuable or authoritative (Espeland& Stevens, 1998; Verran, 2013). Data suggest
how things should be seen, thereby systematically excluding other viewpoints –
they represent a selective construction of reality. Quantification therefore insti-
tutionalises certain ‘orders or worth’ that give us evaluation standards and
justifications for how things are to be viewed and assessed. They not only
make certain aspects visible (and others invisible), they tell us which activities,
achievements or characteristics have a high ‘value’ and which do not, emphasis-
ing certain socially dominant normative principles (Boltanski & Chiapello,
2005; Boltanski & Thévenot, 2006). Classification processes such as determin-
ing, evaluating and categorising are thus implemented using quantifications.
Developing metric value orders can be termed valorisation, a process in
which the objects or people whose valuewe previously could not or only vaguely
quantify can be given a numerical expression. ‘Statistics,’ according to Bettina
Heintz (2010), ‘claim to show a reality that is external to the numbers andmade
visible by them. In fact, however, they are not second versions of an assumed
reality but selective constructions that in part create this reality in the first place.
The objectivity of numbers is thus not a fact but an ascription’ (p. 170, transla-
tion by author). In the status world, numbers not only show value, they also
ascribe it.With this perspective, one can view very different phenomena such as
university rankings, performance measurements in the professional world,
assigning points for hotel personnel’s friendliness, measuring daily steps or
publishing mortality rates in hospitals as part of a comprehensive and inter-
related syndrome.
4. Comparison, competition, hierarchies
Based on the previous background, I argue that quantifying the social not
only represents a specific form of social ascription but also shows effects in
three sociologically relevant ways that have previously been given little
consideration to. There are three steps, which build upon one another and
lead from the fixation with numbers to the creation of new inequalities:
First, by quantifying the social, a new social comparison disposition is
created and strengthened based on the ‘magical power’ of numbers. From
a social viewpoint, comparisons are always particularly effective and con-
vincing if they leave the level of subjective perceptions and interpretations
and are based on objective criteria (or at least criteria that are considered
objective). The power of numbers arises primarily because people are more
prone to trust what they believe to be hard facts than intuition or hearsay
when it comes to social comparisons (Festinger, 1954). Comparisons
always assume comparability, and this can and must first be created, in
INTERNATIONAL STUDIES IN SOCIOLOGY OF EDUCATION 23
part socially. It is not a priori or inherent but instead is embedded in social
processes of understanding about which comparative operations are
appropriate and plausible. Applying numbers is an act done to create
commensurability and make large scale comparisons possible (Espeland
& Stevens, 2008).2 As social aspects are quantified, ‘numerical differences’
(Heintz, 2010) gain importance as an unparalleled amount of data is
created and collected, allowing for the creation of new comparative rela-
tionships. Indicators, measurement tools and standardised systems of
observation give these comparisons the appearance of objectivity and fair-
ness. As social aspects are increasingly turned into data, this provides raw
material for making social comparisons actually or seemingly objective.
Putting qualitative data into numbers can also quickly expand the radius of
comparison and even make it global as long as the respective information
is available on comparison objects.
Second, the quantifying measurement of social aspects encourages an
expansion if not even a universalisation of competition. By transforming
qualitative differences into quantitative inequalities and subjecting what
was previously disparate and not comparable into a single evaluation
scheme to make it comparable, competition is also encouraged. In many
areas, it is the practices of quantification that enable competition to be
staged – a competition that is carried out with the help of numbers.
Because numerical comparisons emphasise difference instead of common-
alities and hierarchy instead of equality, they are the key social foundation
for pushing through the logic of competition. With data, we can now use
more-or-less or better-or-worse comparisons with others in many areas of
our social existence that were previously not explicitly accessible to such
processes. Expanding competitive systems are dependent on the imple-
mentation and subjective adaptation of indicators.
Third, there is a trend towards more social hierarchisation because illustra-
tions like tables, graphics, lists or marks transform qualitative differences into
quantitative inequalities. Almost no attention has been paid to the impact this
has on the structuring and legitimacy of social inequality. According to the
central thesis of this paper, quantifying ascriptions of status ranks change our
inequality structure because what was previously incomparable is made com-
parable and placed in a hierarchical relationship. Numbers describe, create and
reproduce status.
5. Power of nomination and the number regime
If quantification changes the mode of social ranking as described, the question
must be asked: who has the power to set definitions in the new number
regime? Who is the valorisation agent? Who defines the rules according to
which the competition for ranks and/or points is carried out? Who has the
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‘power of nomination’? By ‘power of nomination’, Bourdieu (1985) refers to
the ability to influence and authorise terms and categories as well as percep-
tion and representation schemata, giving them a quasi-official character. The
term is based on the idea that symbolic forms of representation are not only
a reflection of reality but are in the end re-presentations, that is, forms of
representation and description that filter reality, provide interpretations and
suggest certain ways of reading. Those who exercise this power of nomination
make use of certain ‘objectification methods’ (Bourdieu, 1985, p. 20) to push
through their interests while at the same time concealing these same interests.
The ‘expansion of the calculative’ (Vormbusch, 2012) is closely linked to
a stronger social orientation on efficiency, performance, competition, output
and accountability. These are aspects or dimensions of evaluation that pre-
viously fell under the category of ‘economisation’, a term used by many
scholars as a form of critique (Bourdieu, 2004; Schimank & Volkmann,
2008). If there are no markets that are structured by price signals, then an
attempt is made to promote cost awareness and efficiency by creating quasi-
markets (Le Grand, 1991;Weiß, 2001). Competition in the areas of education,
healthcare, in government agencies or between individuals can only be effec-
tively implemented if objectively measurable and predefined performance
parameters are successfully set and then used to determine differences and
allow for better-worse comparisons. Whenever someone wants to create or
intensify competition outside of markets, comparative data must be available.
The usual suspects who are typically considered the backers of economisation
have the primary power of nomination here: influential think tanks, lobbying
groups, business associations, multinational corporations, financial market
actors and political decision-makers who prefer market-oriented solutions
and push reform processes in this direction (Mau, 2019). However, they are
joined by representatives of typical middle-class professions who also argue
for administrative reforms, call for performance ethics or rave about corporate
universities. The particular strength of indicator-based governance is that
direct interventions are then not absolutely necessary, as these processes affect
individuals and institutions by including certain relevance criteria in coding
institutional structures and social environments. ‘Government at a distance’
(Miller & Rose, 1990, p. 9) is the motto here, and it gains social impact
especially through normative pressure and imitation.
Expert regimes also play a major role in exercising the power of nomination.
The ability to represent a certain quantitative standard as legitimate, objectively
appropriate and generalisable often depends entirely on the credibility of those
who establish or support the standard. ‘Emphatically, performance indicators
leverage power via credibility; they do not create power out of thin air’ (Kelly &
Simmons, 2014, p. 56). The development of indicators, classifications or assess-
ments is often placed in the hands of experts precisely because there is a great
need for credibility. The experts’ credibility is converted into an increase in
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legitimacy for the indicators. Today the experts’ power of nomination is by no
means restricted to national experts or a few specialists. An international, if not
a global, scene has developed of those who define standards and help them gain
recognition. For almost every social area, there is an ‘epistemic community’
(Haas, 1992) made up of recognised specialists who share certain (normative,
methodological, epistemic) beliefs. They know each other, they are networked
with each other, and they are successful in creating consensus even beyond
national boundaries for definitions, problems and methods. With their reputa-
tion in a certain field and their privileged access to political decision-makers,
they are active in agenda-setting and the global diffusion of standards for
assessment and evaluation. ‘Epistemic authority’ (Pierson, 1994) means that
those who are recognised as professional experts in a field and have a good
reputation can also (co)determine which understandings, approaches and
classification systems prevail. Systems of indicators are also a key component
in establishing international norms or standards against which everyone must
then be measured or that can no longer be avoided. This also challenges
traditional understandings and puts them under pressure to be justified
(Davis, Fisher, Kingsbury, & Merry, 2012; Kelly & Simmons, 2014; Weisband,
2000). International or supranational organisations such as theWorld Bank, the
International Labour Organization, the OECD, the United Nations and the
European Union are important actors in this nomination process. They use
data as hard facts with soft power.
A particularly clear example of the impact of internationalising expert
regimes can be found in the PISA-study, which brought with it
a fundamental shift in the power of defining what makes education
good. PISA is the OECD’s Programme for International Student
Assessment which tests, every three years, 15-year-old students from all
over the world in reading, mathematics and science. The PISA-study
supplants established and nationally highly varied educational traditions
even against the vehement resistance of key representatives. Pedagogical
success was defined by the experts of an international consortium, slowly
pushing aside alternative criteria and focusing solely on ‘culture-free,
general basic competences’ (Münch, 2009, p. 81, translation by author)
that only include what is measurable and comparable. Together with the
survey experts, the OECD thus became the leader of national educational
policies in many countries (Leibfried & Martens, 2008). Regardless of the
quality and methodological bias of these kinds of comparisons, they have
had an enormous impact on today’s education policies (Martens &
Niemann, 2013), they even shape and define what is considered as good
education or educational success. At this point, one finds a striking alliance
between the scientific drive for evidence-based policies, on the one hand,
and the introduction of managerial principles such as performance mea-
surement and accountability, on the other hand. Either through normative
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constraints, institutional isomorphism or direct political intervention, the
numberization of schools through testing and measurement is advancing.
Everyday school life is nowadays deeply permeated by the principle of
‘learning for the test’ (Münch, 2009). Critics remark that the PISA machin-
ery and attention paid to the results of such tests undermine much of the
traditional purpose of schools (Meier, 2003). Moreover, the test regime
may also run in conflict with teacher’s professional standards and ethos,
thus undermining the professional self-determination.
While internationalized epistemic communities and science and policy
networks are key players in the establishment of orders of quantification,
with the digitalization and the growing importance of Big Data, algorithms
have now become an important tool of the power of nomination too.
Increasingly, algorithms determine who is ranked in which spot or how
social constructs such as risk, health, productivity, credibility or popularity
are depicted. Algorithms are in a certain sense the syntactic manifestations
of the power of nomination. They may often have an aura of objectivity
because they are impersonal and process data, but these calculative prac-
tices themselves are in no way neutral forms of turning social processes
into data. Algorithms are inextricably linked with social forms of attribut-
ing value, and they thus produce and represent that which is to be
considered relevant or valuable (Lupton, 2014). They are based on certain
models, attributions and ideas of value, which allow them to exercise
‘algorithmic power’ (Beer, 2009) or ‘algorithmic authority’ (Rogers, 2013,
p. 97) that is able to code our reality in a specific way (Anderson, 2011;
Gillespie, 2014). On the basis of an ever-growing body of data, algorithms
and high-tech tools are now ‘automating inequality’, creating forms of
exclusion or assigning status (Eubanks, 2017), be it on the credit market,
at the labour market, in the welfare system, for insurers, for product
pricing or for targeted advertisement.
6. Contesting the power of nomination
How can a counter-power be built up in the number regime? A first option
would be to simply ignore the data. For organisations dependent on the
allocation of public funds and forms of accountability, however, this is very
difficult. Even if the allocation of funding is not at stake, there is pressure
to conform because a school with poor performance indicators will lose in
the competition for talented students or patients will avoid a poorly rated
hospital. By making differences visible and assigning rankings, countries,
organisations or individuals are placed in competition for attention, legiti-
macy, prestige and recognition (Werron, 2012).
There are also other suitable counter-strategies to avoid the number
regime known collectively as ‘gaming the numbers’. Gaming means
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‘manipulating rules and numbers in ways that are unconnected to, or
even undermine, the motivation behind them’ (Espeland & Sauder,
2007, p. 29). In gaming, actors expend their energy in getting good
performance ratings without necessarily performing more. Instead of
‘being good’, the focus is on ‘looking good’, whereby image maintenance
and self-representation are placed at centre stage (Gioia & Corley, 2002).
There are no limits to creativity, and not only individuals but entire
organisations have strategically aligned their efforts to certain indicators
based on their importance, attempting to look good at any price based
solely on these measures. But even in cases in which there is no creative
juggling of the numbers, indicators may provide little information about
actual behaviour. Organisational sociology is familiar with the concept
of ‘decoupling’, which points to the gap between formal policies and
actual organisational practices (Meyer & Rowan, 1977). This gap
between programme and practice serves to provide organisations with
external legitimacy but also helps them maintain their internal functions
and adaptability.3
A third counter-strategy would be to challenge the concepts behind the
numbers. Forms of measurements, tests and assessments only achieve
legitimacy if they can appeal to certain ideas of appropriateness and fair-
ness that are also factually accepted. Referring to justice or suitability, for
example, is alever that opposing voices can use to question certain princi-
ples of evaluation. If it is true that the power of nomination often acts
backstage, however, then this means that it is very difficult to politicise
classification practices. When economic imperatives are used, experts take
decisions backed up by their aura of independence and objectivity, or
algorithms use their quiet and invisible processes to determine the taxo-
nomies and evaluation schemes we use to understand reality, then chal-
lengers and critics are faced with a difficult task.
To be heard – whether in the media, by political opponents or from
their own side – the language of numbers is often indispensable. An
increasing number of protest movements are therefore arming themselves
with data expertise so they can have a voice. They must break down the
‘magical reality’ (Bourdieu, 1985, p. 41) of institutionalised taxonomies, for
example by demasking those who profit from it or questioning the neu-
trality and appropriateness of the forms of measurement. The portmanteau
word ‘statactivism’ (Bruno, Didier, & Vitale, 2014) refers to the combina-
tion of activism and statistics in new forms of political mobilisation. Many
groups have recognised that the decision to use certain indicators and
assessment standards influences social structures and, in the long term, will
determine the shape of these structures. NGOs now very actively use the
‘politics of numbers’ to make themselves heard by the public. An indica-
tor’s or index’s branding is often part and parcel of successful lobbying. In
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the context of automated decision-making processes such as algorithms,
movements have also been formed (e.g. the NGO AlgorithmWatch) that
call for making these kinds of technologies more transparent and open to
criticism and for those affected to have the right to object if they are
classified in a certain way.4
One strategy of those who are confronted with criticism of their mea-
surement concepts and indicators is usually to introduce methodological
improvements. Two typical ways of dealing with this can be observed: The
first aims to further streamline the respective criteria by refining methods.
Most initiatives to assert and increase the acceptance of rankings work on
continual improvements (typically more and better measurements) to
increase the data’s reliability. The increasing availability of ever more
data plays into the hands of this approach. Critique does not need to be
external, these kinds of further developments can also arise from internal
criticism and rival methodological approaches. A second strategy of deal-
ing with criticism is to expand the indicator set with additional dimensions
to overcome a focus that is actually or supposedly too narrow. Panels of
experts, hearings with affected people or evaluation studies, but also active
and at times vehement intervention by activists lead to a revision of the
relevant dimensions and contents of evaluation. Objections of this kind are
successful if they not only critique the concept but can also show that the
indicators themselves lead to a series of unintended and problematic
consequences. The power of nomination, which disguises itself with the
mask of ‘technical’ and ‘objective’, can often only be challenged by enga-
ging with its numerical semantics. Because numbers have such an
immense impact, counter-strategies are often only successful if they also
make use of numbers.
7. Indicators and data as symbolic capital
We have now arrived at the final step of the argument which is based on the
social use of numbers. From a sociological perspective, many of these data can
be interpreted as status data: They show where a person, product, service or
organisation stands, they lead to evaluations and comparisons. In short, they
produce status and depict it. Where a school stands, for example, is not only
expressed in tests and evaluation results, it is genuinely made up by scores and
indicators and the regime of worth they represent. These data objectify how
a school performs in comparison to others what, in turn, makes a school more
or less attractive, seen as a ‘problem school’ one should avoid or one parents and
pupils should chose. Thus, status data can become effective as symbolic capital
and promise impressive social or material gains in reputation, which is why
people or organizations continually attempt to improve their data. Symbolic
capital gives actors ‘credit’ with other actors that can be used to secure
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advantages and thus recognition. A person or an organization can use their
reputation to achieve improved status just as a poor reputation or dubious
image can lead to serious disadvantages on the housing, partnership, credit, job
or other markets. Symbolic capital in the form of status data can therefore be
converted into material advantages and useful contacts. ‘Displaying symbolic
capital’ is what in the end ensures that ‘capital leads to capital’ (Bourdieu, 1987,
p. 218). Referring to Bourdieu, Fourcade andHealy (2017) speak of ‘übercapital’
as a form of capital based on data in which information about individuals is
saved and then used to classify and evaluate individuals, thereby deciding on
how to allocate life chances. In the case of visible value metrics, opportunities
for increasing advantages are much greater because direct comparisons of the
symbolic account value can be carried out. If we understand scores (or other
quantifications) as symbolic capital expressed in the language of numbers, then
it becomes clear that the symbolic aspect can be communicated and processed
much more comprehensively in this abstract and generalised form than the
traditional ‘good reputation’ that was often limited in terms of geographic or
subject area.
The question that organisations or status-oriented people must then ask is:
How can I become ‘reputation rich’? (Fertik & Thompson, 2015, p. 6) The fact
that the assessment game of data is not just something that must be accepted as
a given but can be influenced essentially includes the call to do just that. Self-
optimisationmeans not only self-expression but in the contexts being discussed
here refers primarily to improvements and competition so that it becomesmore
and more important for individuals to improve their (measurable) achieve-
ments and, at the same time, make them visible. In turn, making achievements
visible in the age of numbers means that we must aim especially for ‘easy-to-
quantify accomplishments’ (Fertik & Thompson, 2015, p. 63) because it is clear
that frequently used algorithms can read and process especially information
that is available in quantified form. Reputation scores can then easily become
important for an individual just as business indicators are important for
companies: People are called on to make sure that the performance values are
good – a form of individual accounting (see Fourcade, 2016, p.189). They must
become intensively active and use their resources and skills strategically so they
yield numerical success. And they need to become entrepreneurial, that is, risk-
conscious, anticipatory, market-observing, flexible and self-responsible. These
three things: individual value accounting, investment behaviour and entrepre-
neurial orientation regarding their own numbers make people into ‘capitalists
of the self’ (for this argument see Fourcade, 2016). Just as double-entry book-
keeping represented a key basis for developing the capitalist economic system,
the quantification of social aspects could drive forward a more rationalised way
of daily life that is oriented on numbers. The ‘entrepreneurial self’ (Bröckling,
2007), which is subject to the dictate of continual self-optimisation, is then
someone who must ensure that the numbers ‘check out’. Also education is
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partly becoming a number-driven project of the self, replacing traditional
notions of education as self-improvement.
The rule of numbers leads to a gradual change of the social order which,
to put it in slightly exaggerated terms, can be described as further fostering
of competitive forms. Instead of cooperation or a direct conflict of inter-
ests, competition focuses on questions of progressing and outdoing.
Competitors can be individuals but also schools, universities, hospitals,
professions or states depending on which unit is being looked at.
Cooperation is about working together while conflict is a direct confronta-
tion between the affected parties. In contrast, competition is about com-
peting in regard to specific performance goals (Werron, 2010). Quantifying
social aspects opens new doors for continuing to spread the mode of
competition. Ranking tables, health scores, fitness points, performance
indicators or evaluation marks strengthen the comparative disposition,
which leads directly to competition. All competitions depend on the ability
to identify differences in performance, and rankings, scores or ratings
generate the necessary ‘spirit of competitiveness’, turning actors into rivals
driven by the same, overarching criteria. The more visible these criteria
are, the more the actors can be relied on to conform to them. In the
competitive society, one fights for places, recognition or performance
advantages and no longer collectively for power or distributive justice.
Forms of action that are directed at common goals and cooperation are
weakened because individuals view each other as competitors and not as
people who are working toward something together.
Quantifications always go hand in hand with the promise to link value
systems more closely with actual performance and therefore make them
more just. Indeed, adequate performance measures, for example, can
provide opportunities to make achievements visible which were hitherto
ignored. The avoidance of judgements made on the basis of cognitive bias,
hearsay or prejudice can be seen as inherently emancipatory and this also
makes the cult of numbers appealing. However, the promise of a just and
rationalised status system is likely to overemphasise the positive functions
and largely ignores the purpose for which such comparisons are often used
as well as potential concentration effects. When status or performance data
are part of the visible social hierarchy, there are often serious cumulative
and build-up effects. In sociology, hoarding chances and the successive
enlargement of what were originally small differences are often viewed as
pawns in the theory of cumulative advantages (DiPrete & Eirich, 2006).
They assume that previous successes make future successes more likely or,
vice-versa, that disadvantaged positions tend to continue. ‘Success breeds
success’ is the American saying for this. An analogy often used in this
context is that capital that is invested once grows exponentially due to
compound interest effects. Or expressed in a different way: The results of
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our own status work depend heavily on the position in which we start the
race. Those who are successful and reap symbolic capital can more easily
open up other resources or use existing resources with a higher chance of
getting returns. Sociologist Merton (1968) coined the term ‘Matthew effect’
for this using the example of science: Those who have are given more.
Merton was able to show that scientists who were already well-known were
cited particularly often, which can be traced back to the role of reputation.
The symbolic capital that someone gained, e.g. with previous publications,
produces an advantage for all future publications. Decoupling performance
and success with these forms of concentrated attention is not limited to the
field of science (Frank & Cook, 1995). In school and university rankings, it
also holds true that good performers have better chances of continuing to
improve than ‘under-performers’. Cash flows, reputation, attractiveness for
students – all of this depends on rankings (Sauder & Espeland, 2009).
When looking at the use of data from this perspective, it becomes clear
that the idea of a status hierarchy that is increasingly performance-focused
due to quantification points us in a false direction, at least when looking at
the breadth of developments. Measuring social aspects and universalising
competition are thus no guarantee for a rationalisation of status attribution
processes. Numerical reputation advantages can bring with them immense
bonuses just as a lack of good numbers can lead to systematic disadvan-
tages and a downward spiral. An activist culture of performance orienta-
tion and improvement may be implemented with the institutionalisation of
status competition in an increasing number of areas of life, but this is
linked to an inequality regime that tends to decouple performance differ-
ences and returns on success in many areas (Neckel, 2001). By claiming to
be based on objective data, this system ensures that it maintains the image
of fairness, which is what counts in a society that believes itself to be
a meritocracy. Quantitative data, simplified assessment measures and
standardised procedures are legitimising guiderails in the competition for
better numbers that also cover up the ideological principles upon which
they are based and what normative ideas they realise.
8. Conclusion
This kind of society may seem like an exaggeration of individual trends
today, but there are good reasons to assume that demands for measur-
ability and quantification, which act as drivers, will not remain surface-
level phenomena. As we have seen, not only the tools and technologies
for measuring social information have made quantum leaps. The
demand for data for the purpose of social governance is also steadily
increasing. This happens in the area of education, work, social media, in
relation to mobility, in social insurances or the platform economy
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where datafication leads to new forms of valuation and evaluation, and
also shifts power relations. This is not only about indicators for the
central control rooms for societal decisions but about many different
contexts in which data now play a role. Behind the semantics of status
data, which are increasingly prevailing, are changing forms of relation-
ships that are based on more-or-less comparisons. Infrastructures of
evaluation that are steeped in numbers do not remain external to the
institutions or individuals but are practiced and consolidated by socia-
lisation, social expectations and efforts to achieve legitimacy. They
provide reasons, create incentives, and set criteria for relevance, that
is, they determine what counts.
In this world, positive gains are collected primarily by those who shine
with their good numbers. Self-esteem is also affected by quantification: If
we assume that normal concern about self-esteem includes the desire for
attention (Franck, 1998, p. 79), then we can assume that people make an
effort to obtain as good a position as possible in the value order. For
organisations such as schools or universities, performance data have
a conditioning effect. Because the participants make an effort to obtain
the best results possible, indicators, ratings and rankings always have
effects on internal culture and working methods. They therefore do not
remain remote and irrelevant bodies of numbers but start to encroach deep
into the internal organisational practices and self-images: They can re-
calibrate decision-making processes and priorities, bring about changes in
strategic goals, influence personnel decisions and lead to an intensive
examination of the organisations’ own image. From case studies, for
example, we know that rankings can also influence the ‘collective psyche’
of university members (Locke, 2011). By asserting that an institution has
a certain rank, they convey an idea of ‘value’ that in turn affects the self-
esteem of the people or even of a whole organization
Rankings, ratings or scores communicate signals about social value. In
areas in which we do not know anything about the actual value of our
performance, numbers can be a crutch for self-reassurance. If we orient
ourselves on these in order to evaluate and place others in a hierarchy,
then we will tend to believe that others also use these signals to evaluate us.
Classification data thus become relevant to everyone and successively
contribute to us all becoming part of a large social game of mutual
assessment, observation and comparison. To push the argument even
further: The quantification of social life therefore has the potential to call
forth a new regime of inequality in which we are continually assessed and
compared with others, and in which we must continually try to stand out
with good numbers.
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Notes
1. The article builds on my book ‘The Metric Society’ (Mau, 2019) and extents its
argument.
2. In philosophy, there is an enlightening debate on the topic of commensurability
(Chang, 1997), which assumes that different elements or objects can be measured
against one another or compared if at least one ordinal characteristic for comparison
exists or if a hierarchy can be created.
3. Indicators without an institutional calibration, that is, without a precise orientation
on organisations’ operational contexts, always include the risk of this kind of
habitualised decoupling. This does not always have to be problematic because the
slavish implementation of target goals can be highly dysfunctional.
4. One prominent example is the discussion of an alternative measure for welfare
beyond the gross domestic product (GDP). One disadvantage to previous sugges-
tions that take into consideration questions of resource use or inequality – e.g. the
suggestions from the Stiglitz-Sen-Fitoussi Commission in France (Stiglitz, Sen, &
Fitoussi, 2010) – is that up until now it has not been possible to present a convincing
indicator that could replace the gross domestic product as an all-encompassing
measure of welfare and progress.
Disclosure statement
I acknowledge support by the Open Access Publication Fund of Humbolt-Universität zu
Berlin.
Notes on contributor
Steffen Mau is Professor of Macrosociology at Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin,
Department of Social Scienes, Berlin, Germany.
References
Anderson, C. W. (2011). Deliberative, agnostic, and algorithmic audiences: Journalism’s
vision of its public in an age of audience transparency. International Journal of
Communication, 5, 529–547.
Beer, D. (2009). Power through the algorithm? Participatory web cultures and the tech-
nological unconscious. New Media & Society, 11(6), 985–1002.
Boltanski, L., & Chiapello, È. (2005). The new spirit of capitalism. International Journal of
Politics, Culture, and Society, 18(3–4), 161–188.
Boltanski, L., & Thévenot, L. (2006). On justification: Economies of worth. Princeton:
University Press.
Bourdieu, P. (1985). Sozialer Raum und ›Klassen‹. Leçon sur la leçon. Frankfurt am Main:
Suhrkamp.
Bourdieu, P. (1987). Sozialer Sinn. Kritik der theoretischen Vernunft. Frankfurt am Main:
Suhrkamp.
Bourdieu, P. (2004). Gegenfeuer. Konstanz: UVK.
34 S. MAU
Bowerman, M., Raby, H., & Humphrey, C. (2000). In search of the audit society: Some
evidence from health care, police and schools. International Journal of Auditing, 4(1),
71–100.
Bröckling, U. (2007). Das unternehmerische Selbst. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp.
Bruno, I., Didier, E., & Vitale, T. (2014). Statactivism: Form of action between disclosure
and affirmation. Partecipatione E Conflitto, 7(2), 198–220.
Chang, R. (1997). Incommensurability, incomparability, and practical reason. Cambridge:
Harvard University Press.
Crouch, C. (2016). The knowledge corrupters: Hidden consequences of the financial takeover
of public life. Cambridge: Polity Press.
Davis, K. E., Fisher, A., Kingsbury, B., & Merry, S. E. (Eds.). (2012). Governance by
indicators. Global power through quantification and rankings. Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
DiPrete, T. A., & Eirich, G. M. (2006). Cumulative advantage as a mechanism for inequal-
ity: A review of theoretical and empirical developments. Annual Review of Sociology, 32,
271–297.
Doganova, L., Giraudeau, M., Helgesson, C. F., Kjellberg, H., Lee, F., Mallard, A., &
Zuiderent-Jerak, T. (2014). Valuation studies and the critique of valuation. Valuation
Studies, 2(2), 87–96.
Espeland, W., & Sauder, M. (2007). Rankings and reactivity: How public measures recreate
social worlds. American Journal of Sociology, 113(1), 1–40.
Espeland, W., & Sauder, M. (2016). Engines of anxiety: Academic rankings, reputation, and
accountability. New York, NY: Russell Sage Foundation.
Espeland, W., & Stevens, M. (1998). Commensuration as a social process. Annual Review
of Sociology, 24(1), 313–343.
Espeland, W., & Stevens, M. (2008). A sociology of quantification. European Journal of
Sociology, 49(3), 401–436.
Eubanks, V. (2017). Automating Inequality. How high-tch tools profile, police and punish
the poor. New York: St. Martins Press.
Fertik, M., & Thompson, D. C. (2015). The reputation economy. How to optimize your
digital footprint in a world where your reputation is your most valuable asset. London:
Piakus.
Festinger, L. (1954). A theory of social comparison processes.Human Relations, 7(2), 117 140.
Fourcade, M. (2016). Ordinalization: Lewis A. Coser memorial award for theoretical
agenda setting. Sociological Theory, 34(3), 175–195.
Fourcade, M., & Healy, K. (2013). Classification situations: Life-chances in the neoliberal
era. Accounting, Organizations and Society, 38(8), 559–572.
Fourcade, M., & Healy, K. (2017). Seeing Like a Market. Socio-Economic Review, 15(1), 9 29.
Franck, G. (1998). Ökonomie der Aufmerksamkeit. Ein Entwurf. München: Hanser.
Frank, R. H., & Cook, P. J. (1995). The winner-take-all society. How more and more
Americans compete for ever fewer and bigger prizes, encouraging economic waste, income
inequality, and an impoverished cultural life. New York, NY: Free Press.
Gantz, J., & Reinsel, D. (2012). The digital universe in 2020: Big data, bigger digital
shadows, and biggest growth in the far east. Retrieved from: https://www.emc.com/
collateral/analyst-reports/idc-the-digital-universe-in-2020.pdf
Gillespie, T. (2014). The Relevance of Algorithms. In T. Gillespie, P. J. Boczkowski, &
K. A. Foot (Eds.), Media technologies. Essays on communication, materiality, and society
(pp. 167–194). Cambridge: MIT Press.
INTERNATIONAL STUDIES IN SOCIOLOGY OF EDUCATION 35
Gioia, D. A., & Corley, K. G. (2002). Being good versus looking good: Business school
rankings and the circean tranformation from substance to image. Acadamy of
Management Learning & Education, 1(1), 107–120.
Haas, P. M. (1992). Introduction: Epistemic Communities and international policy
coordination. International Organizations, 46(1), 1–35.
Heintz, B. (2010). Numerische Differenz. Überlegungen zu einer Soziologie des (quantita-
tiven) Vergleichs. Zeitschrift Für Soziologie, 39(3), 162–181.
Kelly, J., & Simmons, B. (2014). Politics by numbers: Indicators as social pressure in
international relations. American Journal of Political Science, 59(1), 55–70.
Lamont, M. (2012). Toward a comparative sociology of valuation and evaluation. Annual
Review of Sociology, 38, 201–221.
Le Grand, J. (1991). Quasi-markets and social policy. The Economic Journal, 101(408),
1256–1267.
Leberecht, T. (2015). The business romantic. Give everything, quantify nothing, and create
something greater than yourself. New York, NY: HarperCollins.
Leibfried, S., & Martens, K. (2008). Pisa - Internationalisierung von Bildungspolitik. Oder:
Wie kommt die Landespolitik zur OECD? Leviathan, 36(1), 4–36.
Lingard, B. (2013). Policy as numbers: Ac/counting for educational research. In B. Lingard
(Eds.), Politics, policies and pedagogies in education (pp. 41–64). London: Routledge.
Locke, W. (2011). The Institutionalization of Rankings: Managing status anxiety in an
increasingly marketized environment. In J. C. Shin, R. K. Toutkoushian, & U. Teichler
(Eds.), University rankings. Theoretical basis, methodology and impacts on global higher
education (pp. 201–228). Dordrecht: Springer.
Lupton, D. (2014). Digital Sociology. London: Routledge.
Lupton, D. (2016). The quantified self. A sociology of self-tracking. Cambridge: Polity.
Martens, K., & Niemann, D. (2013). When do numbers count? The differential impact of
the PISA rating and ranking on education policy in Germany and the US. German
Politics, 22(3), 314–332.
Mau, S. (2019). The metric society. On the quantification of the social. Cambridge: Polity
Press.
Meier, D. (2003). In schools we trust. Creating communities of learning in an era of testing
and standardization. Boston: Beacon Press.
Merton, R. K. (1968). the matthew effect in science. Science, 159(3810), 56–63.
Meyer, J. W., & Rowan, B. (1977). Institutionalized organizations: Formal structure as
myth and ceremony. American Journal of Sociology, 83(2), 340–363.
Miller, P., & Rose, N. (1990). Governing economic life. Economy and Society, 19(1), 1–31.
Münch, R. (2009). globale eliten, lokale autoritäten. Bildung und Wissenschaft unter dem
Regime von PISA, McKinsey & Co. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp.
Neckel, S. (2001). ›Leistung‹ und ›Erfolg‹. In E. Barlösius, H. P. Müller, & S. Sigmund
(Eds.), Gesellschaftsbilder im Umbruch. Soziologische Perspektiven in Deutschland (pp.
245–265). Wiesbaden: Springer.
Peetz, T., Aljets, E., Meier, F., & Waibel, D. (2016). Soziologie der Bewertung. Berliner
Journal Für Soziologie, 26(3–4): 307–328.
Pierson, R. (1994). The epistemic authority of expertise. Proceedings of the Biennal Meeting
of the Philosophy of Science Association, 1, 398–405.
Porter, T. M. (1994). Making things quantitative. Science in Context, 7(3), 389–407.
Power, M. (1994). The audit explosion. London: Demos.
Rogers, R. (2013). Digital methods. Cambridge: MIT Press.
Sauder, M., & Espeland, W. N. (2009). The discipline of rankings: Tight coupling and
organizational change. American Sociological Review, 74(1), 63–82.
36 S. MAU
Schimank, U., & Volkmann, U. (2008). Ökonomisierung der Gesellschaft. In A. Maurer
(Ed.), Handbuch der Wirtschaftssoziologie (pp. 382–393). Wiesbaden: Springer.
Schimank, U. (2011). Ökonomisierung der Wissenschaft. Retrieved from http://www.uni-
muenster.de/imperia/md/content/agfortbildung/oekon-wiss-hannover_schimank.pdf
Scott, J. C. (1998). Seeing like a state: How certain schemes to improve the human condition
have failed. New Haven: Yale University Press.
Stiglitz, J., Sen, A., & Fitoussi, J. P. (2010). Mismeasuring our lives. New York, NY: The
New Press.
Strathern, M. (Ed.). (2000). Audit cultures. Anthropological studies in accountability, ethics
and the acadamy. New York, NY: Routledge.
Timmermans, S., & Epstein, S. (2010). A world of standards but not a standard world:
Toward a sociology of standards and standardization. Annual Review of Sociology, 36,
69–89.
Verran, H. (2013). Number. In C. Lury & N. Wakeford (Eds.), Inventive methods. The
happening of the social (pp. 110–124). Abingdon: Routledge.
Vormbusch, U. (2012). Die Herrschaft der Zahlen. Zur Kalkulation des Sozialen in der
kapitalistischen Moderne. Frankfurt am Main: Campus.
Weiß, M. (2001). Quasi-Märkte im Schulbereich. Eine ökonomische Analyse. In J. Oelkers
(Ed.), Zukunftsfragen der Bildung (pp. 69–85). Weinheim: Beltz.
Weisband, E. (2000). Discursive multiliteralism: Global benchmarks, shame and learning
in the ILO labor standards monitoring regime. International Studies Quarterly, 44(4),
643–666.
Werron, T. (2010). Direkte Konflikte, indirekte Konkurrenzen. Unterscheidung und
Vergleich zweier Formen des Kampfes. Zeitschrift Für Soziologie, 39(4), 302–318.
Werron, T. (2012). Worum konkurrieren Nationalstaaten? Zu Begriff und Geschichte der
Konkurrenz um „weiche“ globale Güter. Zeitschrift Für Soziologie, 41(5), 338–355.
INTERNATIONAL STUDIES IN SOCIOLOGY OF EDUCATION 37
